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Section 15
An Analysis of a Self-existent Thing (being and non-being) In 11 Verses
1.
The production of a self-existent thing by a conditioning cause is not possible,
For, being produced through dependence on a cause, a self-existent thing would be "something which is produced" (krtaka).
2.
How, indeed, will a self-existent thing become "something which is produced"?
Certainly, a self-existent thing by definition is "not-produced" and is independent of anything else.
3.
If there is an absence of a self-existent thing, how will an other-existent thing (parabhava) come into being ?
Certainly the self-existence of an other-existent thing is called ''other-existence."
4.
Further, how can a thing exist without either self-existence or other-existence?
If either self-existence or other existence exist, then an existing thing, indeed, would be proved.
5.
If there is no proof of an existent thing, then a non-existent thing cannot be proved.
Since people call the other-existence of an existent thing a "non-existent thing."
6.
Those who perceive self-existence and other-existence, and an existent thing and a non-existent thing,
Do not perceive the true nature of the Buddha's teaching.
7.
In "The Instruction of Katyayana" both "it is" and "it is not" are opposed
By the Glorious One, who has ascertained the meaning of "existent" and non-existent."
8.
If there would be an existent thing by its own nature, there could not be "non-existence' of that thing.
Certainly an existent thing different from its own nature would never obtain.
9.
An opponent asks:
If there is no basic self-nature (prakti), of what will there be "otherness"?
Nargarjuna answers:
If there is basic self-nature, of what will there be "otherness"?
10.
"It is" is a notion of eternity. "It is not" is a nihilistic view.
Therefore, one who is wise does not have recourse to "being" or "non-being."
11.
That which exists by its own nature is eternal since "it does not not-exist."
If it is maintained: "That which existed before does not exist now," there annihilation would logically follow.

Lokayatika Sutta
The Cosmologist
"Now, then, Master Gotama, does everything exist?"
"'Everything exists' is the senior form of cosmology, Brahmin." (i.e. Realism)
"Then, Master Gotama, does everything not exist?"
"'Everything does not exist' is the second form of cosmology, Brahmin." (i.e. Idealism or nihilism)
"Then is everything a Oneness?"
"'Everything is a Oneness' is the third form of cosmology, Brahmin." (i.e. Monism)
"Then is everything a Many-ness?"
"'Everything is a Many-ness' is the fourth form of cosmology, Brahmin. (i.e. Dualism)
Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathágata teaches the Dhamma via the middle...
Kaccayanagotta Sutta
To Kaccayana Gotta (on Right View)
"By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by (takes as its object) a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, 'non-existence' with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, 'existence' with reference to the world does not occur to one."
"'Everything exists': That is one extreme. (i.e. Realism)
'Everything doesn't exist': That is a second extreme. (i.e. Idealism or nihilism)
Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathágata teaches the Dhamma via the middle."
Ánanda Sutta
To Ánanda (on Self, No Self, and Not-self)
Then the wanderer Vacchagotta went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, exchanged courteous greetings with him. After an exchange of friendly greetings and courtesies, he sat down to one side. As he was sitting there he asked the Blessed One:
"Now then, Venerable Gotama, is there a self?" (i.e. Realism) When this was said, the Blessed One was silent.
"Then is there no self?" (i.e. Idealism or nihilism) A second time, the Blessed One was silent...
"Ánanda, if I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self -- were to answer that there is a self, that would be conforming with those priests and contemplatives who are exponents of Eternalism the view that there is an eternal, unchanging soul.
If I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self -- were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with those priests and contemplatives who are exponents of Annihilationism the view that death is the annihilation of consciousness.
If I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self -- were to answer that there is a self (i.e. Realism), would that be in keeping with the arising of knowledge that all phenomena are not-self?"
"No, lord."
"And if I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self -- were to answer that there is no self (i.e. Idealism or nihilism), the bewildered Vacchagotta would become even more bewildered: 'Does the self I used to have now not exist?'"
Culasihanada Sutta
The Shorter Discourse on the Lion's Roar
"Bhikkhus, there are these two views: the view of being and the view of non-being.
Any recluses or Brahmins who rely on the view of being (i.e. Realism), adopt the view of being, accept the view of being, are opposed to the view of non-being.
Any recluses or Brahmins who rely on the view of non-being (i.e. Idealism or nihilism), adopt the view of non-being, accept the view of non-being, are opposed to the view of being.
"Any recluses or Brahmins who do not understand as they actually are the origin, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger and the escape in the case of these two views are affected by lust, affected by hate, affected by delusion, affected by craving, affected by clinging, without vision, given to favoring and opposing, and they delight in and enjoy proliferation. They are not freed from birth, aging and death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair; they are not freed from suffering, I say.
"Any recluses or Brahmins who understand as they actually are the origin, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger and the escape in the case of these two views are without lust, without hate, without delusion, without craving, without clinging, with vision, not given to favoring and opposing, and they do not delight in and enjoy proliferation. They are freed from birth, aging and death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair; they are freed from suffering, I say.
Palileyyaka Sutta
At Palileyyaka
'This self is the same as the cosmos. This I will be after death, constant, lasting, eternal, not subject to change.' This eternalist view is a fabrication...
Or...he may have a view such as this: 'I would not be, neither would there be what is mine. I will not be, neither will there be what is mine.' This annihilationist view is a fabrication...
Dhammacakkapavattana Sutta
Setting the Wheel of Dhamma in Motion
"There are these two extremes that are not to be indulged in by one who has gone forth. Which two? That which is devoted to sensual pleasure with reference to sensual objects: base, vulgar, common, ignoble, unprofitable; and that which is devoted to self-affliction: painful, ignoble, unprofitable. Avoiding both of these extremes, the middle way realized by the Tathágata -- producing vision, producing knowledge -- leads to calm, to direct knowledge, to self-awakening, to Unbinding.
"And what is the middle way realized by the Tathágata that -- producing vision, producing knowledge -- leads to calm, to direct knowledge, to self-awakening, to Unbinding? Precisely this Noble Eightfold Path: right view, right resolve, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration. This is the middle way realized by the Tathágata that -- producing vision, producing knowledge -- leads to calm, to direct knowledge, to self-awakening, to Unbinding.
Isidatta Sutta
About Isidatta
"Venerable sir, concerning the various views that arise in the world -- `The cosmos is eternal' or `The cosmos isn't eternal'; `The cosmos is finite' or `The cosmos is infinite'; `The soul and the body are the same' or `The soul is one thing, the body another'; `A Tathágata exists after death' or `A Tathágata doesn't exist after death' or `A Tathágata both exists & doesn't exist after death' or `A Tathágata neither exists nor doesn't exist after death'; these along with the sixty-two views mentioned in the Brahmajala -- when what is present do these views come into being, and when what is absent do they not come into being?"
When this was said, the senior monk was silent. A second time...A third time...
Dhammapada
The Brahmin
Cut the stream and go across, abandon sensuality, Brahmin. When you have achieved the stilling of
the activities of the mind, you will know the unconditioned, Brahmin.
When a Brahmin has crossed beyond duality, then all the fetters of such a seer come to an end.
When a man knows no this shore, other shore, or both - such a one, free from anxiety, liberated, that is what I call a Brahmin.
Ganika Sutta
The Courtesan
What's been attained, what's to be attained,
are both defiled by one who trains
in line with the afflicted.
Those for whom precepts and practices
are the essence of the training,
for whom celibacy is the essence of service:
this is one extreme.
Those who say, "There's no harm in sensual desires":
this is the second extreme.
Both of these extremes cause the growth of cemeteries,
and cemeteries cause views to grow.
Not directly knowing these two extremes,
some fall short,
some run too far.
But those who directly know them,
don't exist there,
don't conceive things
through them.
And for these people,
there's no whirling through the cycle
to be described.
From: A Survey of the Paths of Tibetan Buddhism by His Holiness Tenzing Gyatso, 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet
...When we take into account the different explanations of various philosophical schools within Buddhism, including the great vehicle schools, it is necessary to discriminate those sutras that are definitive and those requiring further interpretation. If we were to make these distinctions on the basis of scriptural texts alone, we would have to verify the scripture we used for determinating whether something was interpretable or definitive against another sutra, and because this would continue in an infinite regression it would not be a very reliable method. Therefore, we have to determine whether a sutra is definitive or interpretable on the basis of logic. So, when we speak of the great vehicle philosophical schools, reason is more important than the scripture.
How do we determine whether something is interpretable? There are different types of scriptures belonging to the interpretable category, for instance, certain sutras mention that one's parents are to be killed. Now, since these sutras cannot be taken literally, at face value, they require further interpretation. The reference here to parents is to the contaminated actions and attachment which brings about rebirth in the future.
Similarly, in tantras such as Guhyasamaja the Buddha says that the Tathágata or Buddha is to be killed and that if you kill the Buddha, you will achieve supreme enlightenment.
It is obvious that these scriptures require further interpretation. However, other sutras are less obviously interpretable. The sutra which explains the twelve links of dependent arising, states that because of the cause, the fruits ensue. An example is that because of ignorance within, contaminated actions come about. Although the content of this type of sutra is true on one level, it is categorized as interpretable, because when ignorance is said to induce contaminated action, it does not refer to the ultimate point of view. It is only on the conventional level that something can produce something else. From the ultimate point of view, its nature is emptiness. So, because there is a further, deeper level not referred to in these sutras, they are said to be interpretable.
Definitive sutras are those sutras, like the Heart of Wisdom, in which the Buddha spoke of the ultimate nature of phenomena, that form of emptiness and emptiness is form; apart from form, there is no emptiness. Because such sutras speak of the ultimate nature of phenomena, their ultimate mode of existence, emptiness, they are said to be definitive. However, we should also note that there are different ways of discriminating between definitive and interpretable sutras among different Buddhist schools of thought.
In short, the texts of the Middle Way Consequentialist (Madhyamika Prasangika) school, particularly those by Nargarjuna and his disciple Chandrakirti, are definitive and expounded the view of emptiness the Buddha taught to its fullest extent. The view of emptiness expound the view of emptiness the Buddha taught to its fullest extent. The view of emptiness expounded in these texts is not contradicted by logical reasoning, but rather is supported by it.
Amongst the definitive sutras are also included sutras belonging to the third turning of the wheel of doctrine, particularly the Tathágata Essence Sutra, which is actually the fundamental source of such Middle Way treatises as the Sublime Continuum and the Collection of Praises written by Nargarjuna...

Section 16
An Analysis of Being Bound and Release (Bondage and Release) In 10 verses
1.
When conditioned elements (dispositions, conditioning?) continue to change (through rebirths?), they do not continue to change as eternal things (the same before and after).
Likewise they do not continue to change as non-eternal things (different before and after).
The arguments here is the same as for a living being.
2.
If the personality would change when it is sought five ways in the "groups" (skandha), "bases of sense perception" (ayatana), and the "irreducible elements" (dhatu),
Then it does not exist. Who is it who will change (i.e. transmigrate)?
3.
Moving from "acquisition" (upadana) to "acquisition" would be "that which is without existence" (vibhava).
Who is he who is without existence and without acquisition? To what will he change (i.e. transmigrate)?
4.
The final cessation (nirvana) of the conditioned elements certainly is not possible at all.
Nor is the final cessation of even a living being possible at all.
5.
The conditioned elements, whose nature (dharma) is arising and destruction, neither are bound nor released.
Likewise a living being neither is bound nor released.
6.
If the acquisition (upadana) were the "binding," that one having the acquisition is not bound;
Nor is that one not having the acquisition bound.
Then in what condition is he bound?
7.
Certainly if the "binding" would exist before "that which is bound," then it must bind;
But that does not exist. The remaining analysis is stated in the analysis of "the present going to," "that which has already gone to" and "that which has not yet gone to."
8.
Therefore, "that which is bound" is not released and "that which is not bound" is likewise not released.
If "that which is bound" were released, "being bound" and "release" would exist simultaneously.
9.
"I will be released without any acquisition."
"Nirvana will be mine."
Those who understand thus hold too much to "a holding on" i.e., both to the acquisition of karma, and to a viewpoint.
10.
Where there is a super-imposing of nirvana on something else, nor a removal of existence-in-flux,
What is the existence-in-flux there?
What nirvana is imagined?
Section 17
An Analysis of Action (karma) and Its Product (action and its results) In 33 verses
1.
The state of mind, which is self-disciplined, being favorably disposed toward others,
And friendship: that is the dharma; that is the seed for the fruit now and after death.
2.
The most perceptive seer Buddha has said that there is action (karma) as volition and as a result of having willed.
The variety of acts of that action has been explained in many ways.
3.
Thus, that action which is called "volition": that is considered by tradition as mental;
But that action which is a result of having willed: that is considered by tradition as physical or verbal.
4.
Sound (1), gesture (2) and that which does not rest which is considered as unknown (3),
Also the other unknown which is considered to be at rest (4);
5.
That which is pure as a result of enjoyment (5), that which is impure as a result of enjoyment (6),
And volition (7): these seven basic elements (dharma) are considered by the tradition as the modes of action.
6.
If an action exists by enduring to the time of its fulfillment, that action would be eternal.
If an action were stopped—being stopped, what will it produce?
7.
There is fruit (phala) when a process, a sprout, etc., starts from a seed;
But without a seed that process does not proceed.
8.
Inasmuch as the process is dependent on a seed and the fruit is produced from the process,
The fruit, presupposing the seed, neither comes to an end nor is eternal.
9.
There is a product (phala) when a mental process starts from a thoughts;
But without a thought that process does not proceed.
10.
Inasmuch as the process is dependent on a thought and the product (phala) is produced from the process,
The product, presupposing the thought, neither comes to an end nor is eternal.
11.
The ten pure "paths of action" are means for realizing the dharma.
And the five qualities of desired objects i.e., desire to know the form, sound, odor, taste, and touch of existence are fruits (phala) of the dharma both now and after death.
12.
There would be many great mistakes if that explanation were accepted.
Therefore, that explanation is not possible.
13.
In rebuttal I will explain the interpretation which can be made to fit the facts,
That which is followed by the Buddha, the self-sufficient enlightened ones (Pratyekabuddha) and the disciples of Buddha.
14.
As "that which is imperishable" is like a credit on an account statement, so an action (karma) is like a debt.
The imperishable is of four kinds in its elements (dhatu) i.e., desire, form, non-form, and pure; in its essential nature it cannot be analyzed.
15.
An imperishable force is not destroyed qua destruction; rather it is destroyed according to spiritual discipline.
Therefore, the fruit of actions originates by the imperishable force.
16.
If the imperishable force were that which is destroyed by usual destruction or by transference of action,
Fallacies like the destruction of action would logically result.
17.
At the moment of transition that imperishable force
Of all identical and different actions belonging to the same element (dhatu) originates.
18.
That imperishable force is the dharma, having arisen by one action after another in visible existence;
And it remains constant even in the development of all bifurcating action.
19.
That imperishable force is destroyed by death and by avoiding the product (phala) .
There the difference is characterized as impure and pure.
20.
"Emptiness," "no annihilation," existence-in-flux, "non-eternity,"
And the imperishable reality of action: such was the teaching taught by the Buddha.
Nargarjuna refutes the above arguments:
21.
Why does the action not originate?
Because it is without self-existence.
Since it does not originate, it does not perish.
22.
If an action did exist as a self-existent thing, without a doubt, it would be eternal.
An action would be an un-produced thing; certainly, there is no eternal thing which is produced.
23.
If the action were not produced, then there could be the fear attaining something from "something not produced";
Then the opposite to a saintly discipline would follow as a fallacy.
24.
Then, undoubtedly, all daily affairs would be precluded.
And even the distinction between saints and sinners is not possible.
25.
Then an act whose development had taken place would develop again,
If an act, because it persists, exists through its own nature.
26.
An action is that whose "self" (atman) is desire, and the desires do not really exist.
If these desires do not really exist, how would the action really exist?
27.
Action and desire are declared to be the conditioning cause of the body.
If action and desire are empty, what need one say about "body"?
28.
An opponent tries to establish an identifiable entity by saying:
The man shrouded in ignorance, and chained by craving (trsna)
Is one who seeks enjoyment. He is not different from the one who acts, nor identical to it.
29.
Nargarjuna answers:
Since action is not "originated presupposing the conditions" nor fails to arise from presupposing the conditions, There is no one acting.
30.
If there is no action, how could there be one who acts and the product of action?
And if there is no product, how can there be an enjoyer of the product?
31.
Just as a teacher, by his magical power, formed a magical form,
And this magical form formed again another magical form—
32.
Just so the "one who forms" is himself being formed magically; and the act performed by him
Is like a magical form being magically formed by another magical form.
33.
Desires, actions, bodies, producers, and products
Are like a fairy castle, resembling a mirage, a dream.
Section 18
An Analysis of the Individual Self (the Self and Phenomena) In 12 verses
1.
If the individual self (atma) were identical to the "groups" (skandha), then it would partake of origination and destruction.
If the individual self were different from the "groups," then it would be without the characteristics of the "groups."
2.
If the individual self does not exist, how then will there be something which is "my own"?
There is lack of possessiveness and no ego on account of the cessation of self and that which is "my own."
3.
He who is without possessiveness and who has no ego — He, also, does not exist.
Whoever sees "he who is without possessiveness" or "he who has no ego" really does not see.
4.
When "I" and "mine" have stopped, then also there is not an outside nor an inner self.
The "acquiring" of karma (upadana) is stopped; on account of that destruction, there is destruction of verse existence.
5.
On account of the destruction of the pains (klesa) of action there is release for pains of action exist for him who constructs them.
These pains result from phenomenal extension (prapanca); but this phenomenal extension comes to a stop by emptiness.
7.
When the domain of thought has been dissipated, "that which can be stated" is dissipated.
Those things which are un-originated and not terminated, like nirvana, constitute the Truth (dharmata).
8.
Everything is "actual" (tathyam) or "not-actual," or both "acts actual-and-not-actual,"
Or "neither-actual-nor-not-actual":
This is the teaching of the Buddha.
9.
"Not caused by something else," "peaceful," "not elaborated by discursive thought,"
"Indeterminate," "undifferentiated": such are the characteristics of true reality (tattva).
10.
Whatever exists, being dependent on something else, is certainly not identical to that other thing,
Nor is a thing different from that; therefore, it is neither destroyed nor eternal.
11.
The immortal essence of the teaching of the Buddhas, the lords of the world, is
Without singleness or multiplicity; it is not destroyed nor is it eternal.
12.
If fully-developed Buddhas do not arise in the world and the disciples of the Buddha disappear,
Then, independently, the knowledge of the self-produced enlightened ones (Pratyekabuddha) is produced.

Section 19
An Analysis of Time (Time) In 6 verses
1.
If "the present" and "future" exist presupposing "the past,"
"The present" and "future" will exist in "the past."
2.
If "the present" and "future" did not exist there in "the past",
How could "the present" and "future" exist presupposing that "past?
3.
Without presupposing "the past" the two things "the present" and "future" cannot be proved to exist.
Therefore neither present nor future time exist.
4.
In this way the remaining two times can be inverted.
Thus one would regard "highest," "lowest" and "middle," etc., as oneness and difference. (or "after," "before" and "middle", or "right," "left" and "middle" …)
5.
A non-stationary "time" cannot be "grasped"; and a stationary "time" which can be grasped does not exist.
How, then, can one perceive time if it is not "grasped"?
6.
Since time is dependent on a thing (bhava), how can time exist without a thing?
There is not any thing which exists; how, then, will time become something?

Section 20
An Analysis of the Aggregate of Causes and Conditions (cause and effect) In 24 verses
1.
If a product (phala) is produced through the aggregate of causes and conditions,
And exists in an aggregate, how will it be produced in the aggregate?
2.
If a product is produced in the aggregate of causes and conditions,
And does not exist in the aggregate, how will it be produced in the aggregate?
3.
If the product is in the aggregate of causes and conditions,
Would it not be "grasped" i.e., located in the aggregate? But it is not "grasped" in the aggregate.
4.
If the product is not in the aggregate of causes and conditions,
Then the causes and conditions would be the same as non-causes and non-conditions.
5.
If a cause, having given the cause for a product, is stopped,
Then that which is "given" and that which is stopped would be two identities of the cause.
6.
If a cause without having given the cause for a product is stopped
Then, the cause being stopped, the product would be produced as something derived from a non-cause (ahetuka).
7.
If the product would become visible concomitantly with the aggregate of causes and conditions,
Then it would logically follow that the producer and that which is produced exist in the same moment.
8.
If the product would become visible before the aggregate,
Then the product, without being related to causes and conditions, would be something derived from a non-cause.
9.
If, when the cause of the product is stopped, there would be a continuation of the cause,
It would logically follow that there would be another production of the previous producing cause.
10.
How can that which is stopped, i.e., something which has disappeared, produce the arising of a product?
How could a cause which is enclosed by its product, even though it persists, originate that product?
11.
Or if that cause were not enclosed by the product, which product would it produce?
For the cause does not produce the product, having seen or not having seen the product.
12.
There is no concomitance of a past product with a past cause, a future cause or present cause.
13.
Certainly there is no concomitance of the present product with future cause, past cause or present cause.
14.
Certainly there is no concomitance of a future product with a present cause, future cause or past cause.
15.
If there is no concomitance whatever, how would the cause produce the product?
Or if a concomitance exists, how would the cause produce the product?
16.
If the cause is empty of a product, how would it produce the product?
If the cause is not empty of a product, how would it produce the product?
17.
A non-empty product would not be originated, and a non-empty product would not be destroyed.
Then that is non-empty which will not originate or not disappear.
18.
How would that be produced which is empty?
How would that be destroyed which is empty?
It logically follows, then, that which is empty is not originated and not destroyed.
19.
Certainly a oneness of cause and product is not possible at all.
Nor is a difference of cause and product possible at all.
20.
If there were a oneness of the cause and product, then there would be an identity of the originator and what is originated.
If there were a difference of product and cause, then a cause would be the same as that which is not a cause.
21.
Can a cause produce a product which is essentially existing in itself (svabhva) ?
Can a cause produce a product which is not essentially existing in itself (svabhava) ?
22.
It is not possible to have "what is by its nature a cause" (hetutva) of "that which is not producing."
If "what is by its nature a cause" is not possible, whose product will exist?
23.
How will that aggregate of causes and conditions produce a product when
That which is the aggregate of causes and conditions does not produce itself by itself?
24.
The product is not produced by the aggregate;
nor is the product not produced by the aggregate.
Without the product, how is there an aggregate of conditions?

Section 21
An Analysis of Origination and Disappearance (coming to be and passing away) In 21 verses
1.
There is no disappearance either with origination or without it.
There is no origination either with disappearance or without it.
2.
How, indeed, will disappearance exist at all without origination?
How could there be death without birth?
There is no disappearance without prior origination.
3.
How can disappearance exist concomitantly with origination?
Since, surely, death does not exist at the same moment as birth.
4.
How, indeed, will origination exist at all without disappearance?
For, impermanence does not fail to be found in existent things ever.
5.
How can origination exist concomitantly with disappearance?
Since, surely, death does not exist at the same moment as birth.
6.
When two things cannot be proved either separately or together,
No proof exists of those two things.
How can these two things be proved?
7.
There is no origination of that which is destructible, nor of that which is not-destructible.
There is no disappearance of that which is destructible nor of that which is non-destructible.
8.
Origination and disappearance cannot exist without an existent thing.
Without origination and disappearance an existent thing does not exist.
9.
Origination and disappearance does not obtain for that which is empty.
Origination and disappearance does not obtain for that which is non-empty.
10.
It does not obtain that origination and disappearance are the same thing.
It does not obtain that origination and disappearance are different.
11.
You argue: Origination, as well as disappearance, is seen.
Therefore it would exist for you.
But origination and disappearance are seen due to a delusion.
12.
An existent thing does not originate from another thing;
and an existent thing does not originate from a non-existent thing.
Also, a non-existent thing does not originate from another non-existent thing;
and a non-existent thing does not originate from an existent thing.
13.
An existent thing does not originate either by itself or by something different.
Or by itself and something different at the same time. How, then, can it be produced?
14.
For someone assuming an existent thing, either an Eternalistic or nihilistic point of view would logically follow,
For that existent thing would be either eternal or liable to cessation.
15.
An opponent objects:
For someone assuming an existent thing, there is not only Eternalism or nihilism,
Since this is existence: namely, the continuity of the originating and stopping of causes and product.
16.
Nargarjuna replies:
If this is existence: namely, the continuity of originating and stopping of causes and product,
It would logically follow that the cause is destroyed because the destroyed thing does not originate again.
17.
If there is self-existence of something which is intrinsically existing, then non-existence does not obtain.
At the time of nirvana there is destruction of the cycle of existence (bhavasamtana) as a result of the cessation.
18.
If the last part of existence is destroyed, the first part of existence does not obtain.
If the last part of existence is not destroyed, the first part of existence does not obtain.
19.
If the first part of existence were produced while the final part were being destroyed,
There would be one thing being destroyed and being produced both at the same time.
20.
If the one "being destroyed" and the one "being produced" cannot exist together,
Can someone be produced in those "groups of universal elements" (skandhas) in which he is also "dying"?
21.
Thus, the chain of existences is not possible in any of the tree times i.e. past, present, and future;
And if it does not exist in the three times, how can the chain of existences exist?