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Section 7
An Analysis of Composite Products (origination, duration, and decay) In 34 Verses
1.
If origination (utpada) is a composite product, then the three characteristics of existence: "origination," "duration," and "dissolution" are appropriate.
But if origination is a non-composite (asamstrta), then how could there be characteristics of a composite product?
2.
When the three are separate, origination of either of the other two characteristics does not suffice to function as a characteristic.
If united in a composite product, how could they all be at one place at one time?
3.
If origination, duration, and dissolution are other secondary characteristics of composite products,
It is an infinite regress. If this is not so, they are not composite products.
4.
The "originating origination" (utpadotpada) (i.e. the beginning of the origination) is only the origination of the basic origination (mulotpada) (i.e. the beginning of the product);
Also the origination of the basic origination (i.e. the beginning of the beginning of the product) produces the "originating origination." (i.e. the beginning of the origination)
5.
But if, according to you, the originating origination (i.e. self-originating origination) produces basic origination, (i.e. also causes the beginning of the product)
How, according to you, will this originating origination (i.e. self-originating origination) produce that basic origination (i.e. the beginning of the product) if it itself is not produced by basic origination (i.e. the beginning of the product)?
6.
If, according to you, that which has originated through basic origination (i.e. referring to the dependent originating origination) produces basic origination, (i.e. like affirming that the effect exist before the cause)
How does the basic origination, which is yet un-produced by that originating origination (i.e. self-originating origination), cause that originating origination (i.e. self-originating origination) to be originated?
7.
According to you, this, while originating, would certainly cause that to originate—
If this, not being produced, would be able to cause origination.
8.
The opponent claim:
As a light is the illuminator of both itself and that which is other than itself,
So origination would originate both itself and that which is other than itself.
9.
Nargarjuna answers:
There is no darkness in the light and there where the light is placed.
What could the light illumine? Indeed illumination is the getting rid of darkness.
10.
How is darkness destroyed by the light being originated,
When the light, being originated, does not come in contact with darkness?
11.
But then, if darkness is destroyed by a light having no contact with darkness,
A light placed here will destroy the darkness of the entire world.
12.
If the light illuminated both itself and that which is other than itself,
Then, without a doubt, darkness will cover both itself and that which is other than itself.
13.
If it has not yet originated, how does origination produce itself?
And if it has already originated, when it is being produced, what is produced after that which is already produced?
14.
In no way does anything originate
by what is being originated (ii),
by what is already originated (iii),
or by what is not yet originated (i)—
Just as it has been said in the analysis of "presently going to (ii)," "that which is already gone to (i)" and "that which is not yet gone to (iii)."
15.
When, in that-which-is-originated (iii), there is nothing which activates that which is being originated (ii),
How can one say: That which is being originated (ii) exists presupposing that which is produced?
16.
Whatever comes into existence presupposing something else is without self-existence (stabhava).
As there is an allayment of "being originated," so also of that which is originated (iii).
17.
If some particular thing which is not yet originated (i) is indeed known to exist,
That thing will be originated. What originates if it does not exist?
18.
And if the origination originates that which is being originated (ii),
What origination, in turn, would originate that origination? (i.e. infinite regress)
19.
If another origination originates that origination, there will be an infinite regress of originations.
But if non-origination is that which is origination, then everything without qualification would originate.
20.
It is not possible that what has originated either exists or does not exist,
Nor that what has not originated either exists or does not exist; this has been demonstrated earlier.
21.
The origination of something being destroyed is not possible;
And whatever is not being destroyed, that entity is not possible.
22.
Neither an "entity that has endured (iii)" (sthitabhava) nor an "entity that has not endured (i)" endures;
Not even something enduring (ii) endures.
And what endures if it is not originated?
23.
Duration is not possible of a thing that is being destroyed.
But whatever is not being destroyed, that thing (bhava) is also not possible.
24.
Because every entity always remains in the law of old age and death,
What entities are there which endure without old age and death?
25.
The enduring quality of a different duration is as impossible as of that same duration,
So the origination of origination is neither itself nor that which is other than itself.
26.
"That which has ceased (iii)" (niruddha) does not cease; and "that which has not ceased (i)" does not cease;
Nor even "that which is ceasing (ii)."
For, what can cease if it is produced? (i.e. or if it is not really produced?)
27.
Therefore cessation of an enduring entity is not possible.
Moreover, cessation of a non-enduring entity is not possible.
28.
Indeed, a state of existence does not cease because of this state;
And a different state of existence does not cease because of a different state.
29.
So, if the production of all dharmas is not possible,
Then neither is the cessation of all (i.e. any?) dharmas possible.
30.
Therefore cessation of a real existing entity is not possible;
And certainly both an existing entity and a non-existing entity cannot be possible in the same case.
31.
Even more, cessation of a non-real existing entity is not possible.
Just as there is no second decapitation!
32.
There is no cessation by means of itself; nor cessation by something other than itself;
Just as there is no origination of origination by itself nor by another.
33.
Because the existence of production, duration, and cessation is not proved, there is no composite product (samskrta);
And if a composite product is not proved, how can a non-composite product (asamskrta) be proved?
34.
As a magic trick, a dream or a fairy castle.
Just so should we consider origination, duration, and cessation.

Section 8
An Analysis of the Product (Karma) and the Producer (action and agent) In 13 verses
1.
A real producer does not produce a real product.
Even more so, a non-real producer does not seek a non-real product.
2.
There is no producing action of a real thing; if so, there would be a product without someone producing.
Also, there is no producing by a real thing; if so, there would be someone producing without something produced.
3.
If a non-existent producer would produce a non-real product,
The product would be without a causal source and the producer would be without a causal source.
4.
If there is no causal source, there is nothing to be produced nor cause-in-general (karana).
Then neither do the producing action, the person producing, nor the instrument of production (karana) exist.
5.
If the producing action, etc. do not exist, then neither can the true reality (dharma) nor false reality (adharma) exist.
If neither the true reality nor the false reality exists, then also the product (phala) born from that does not exist.
6.
If there is no real product, then there also exists no path to heaven nor to ultimate release.
Thus it logically follows that all producing actions are without purpose.
7.
And a real-non-real producer does not produce in a real-non-real manner.
For, indeed, how can "real" and "non-real," which are mutually contradictory, occur in one place?
8.
A real producer (kartra) does not produce what is non-real, and a non-real producer does not produce what is real.
From that indeed, all the mistakes must logically follow.
9.
The producer, who is neither real nor non-real, does not produce a product which is either real or non-real,
Because of the reasons which have been advanced earlier.
10.
The non-real producer does not produce a product which is not real, nor both real-and-non-real,
Because of the reasons which have been advanced earlier.
11.
And a real-non-real producer does not produce a product which is neither real nor non-real.
This is evident from the reasons which have been advanced earlier.
12.
The producer proceeds being dependent on the product, and the product proceeds being dependent on the producer.
The cause for realization (i.e. Nirvana) is seen in nothing else.
13.
In the same way one should understand the "acquiring" (i.e. of karma - upadana) on the basis of the "giving up," etc. of the producer and the product.
By means of this analysis of the product and the producer all other things should be dissolved.

Section 9
An Analysis of "the Pre-existent Reality" (grasper and grasping) In 12 verses
1.
Certain people say: Prior to seeing hearing, and other sensory faculties together with sensation and other mental phenomena
Is that to which they belong.
2.
They reason: How will there be seeing, etc. of someone (i.e. as the subject seeing) who does not exist?
Therefore, there exists a definite (vyavasthita) entity before that seeing, etc..
3.
But that definite entity is previous to sight, hearing, etc., and sensation, etc --
How can that entity be known?
4.
And if that entity is determined without sight and other sensory faculties,
Then, undoubtedly, those sensory faculties will exist without that entity.
5.
Someone becomes manifest by something (i.e. like vision); something is manifest by someone.
How would someone exist without something? How would something exist without someone?
6.
The opponent admits:
Someone does not exist previous to (purva) sight and all the other faculties together.
Rather, he is manifested by any one of them: sight, etc., at any one time.
7.
Nargarjuna answers:
But if nothing exists previous to sight and all the other faculties together,
How could that being exist individually before sight, etc.?
8.
Further, if that being were the "seer," that being were the "hearer," that being were the one who senses,
Then one being would exist previous to each. Therefore, this hypothesis is not logically justified.
9.
On the other hand, if the "seer" were someone else, or the "hearer" were someone else, or the one who senses were someone else,
Then there would be a "hearers when there was already a "seer," and that would mean a multiplicity of "selves" (atma).
11.
When he to whom seeing, hearing, etc., and feeling, etc. belong does not exist,
Then certainly they do not exist.
12.
For him who does not exist previous to, at the same time, or after seeing, etc.
The conception "He exists," "He does not exist," is dissipated.
Section 10
An Analysis of Fire and Kindling (Fire and Fuel) In 16 Verses)
1.
If fire is identical to its kindling, then it is both producer and product.
And if fire is different from kindling, then surely fire exists without kindling (i.e. separate).
2.
A fire which is perpetually burning would exist without a cause, which is kindling,
Since another beginning would be pointless; in this case fire is without its object i.e., burning of kindling.
3.
Fire is without a cause, namely kindling, if it were independent of anything else;
In which case another beginning would be pointless, and there is perpetual burning.
4.
If it is maintained: Kindling is that which is being kindled,
By what is kindling kindled, since kindling is only that kindling?
It is inherent existence that would make extinguishing /liberation impossible
5.
Fire, when different and not obtained through kindling, will not obtain; not burning, it will not burn later;
Without extinction, it will not be extinguished; if there is no extinction, then it will remain with its own characteristics.
6.
The opponent claims:
If fire is different from kindling it could obtain the kindling
As a woman obtains a husband, and a man obtains a wife.
7.
Nargarjuna answers:
Though fire is different from kindling, it could indeed obtain the kindling,
On the condition that both fire and kindling can be reciprocally differentiated —but, this is impossible.
8.
If the fire is dependent on the kindling, and if the kindling is dependent on the fire
Which is attained first, dependent on which they are fire and kindling?
9.
If fire is dependent on kindling, so is the proof of the proved fire.
Thus, being kindling it will exist without fire.
10.
When a thing (bhava) is proved by being dependent on something else, then it proves the other by being dependent on it.
If that which is required for dependence must be proved, then what is dependent on what?
11.
If that thing is proved by being dependent, how can that which has not been proved be dependent?
So, that which is proved is dependent; but the dependence is not possible.
12.
Fire does not exist in relation to kindling; and fire does not exist unrelated to kindling.
Kindling does not exist in relation to fire; and kindling does not exist unrelated to fire.
13.
Fire does not come from something else;
and fire does not exist in kindling.
The remaining analysis in regard to kindling is described by the analysis of "that which is being gone to," "that which is gone to" and ''that which is not yet gone to."
14.
Fire is not identical to kindling, but fire is not in anything other than kindling.
Fire does not have kindling as its property; also, the kindling is not in fire and vice versa.
15.
By the analysis of fire and kindling the syllogism of the individual self (atma) and "the acquiring" (upadana)
Is fully and completely explained, as well as "the jar" and "the cloth" and other analogies.
16.
Those who specify the nature of the individual self and of existing things (bhava) as radically different—
Those people I do not regard as ones who know the sense of the teaching.

Section 11
An Analysis of the Past (purva) and Future Limits (aparakiti) of Existence (samsara) In 8 verses
1.
The great ascetic Buddha said: "The extreme limit (koti) of the past cannot be discerned."
"Existence-in-flux" (samsara) is without bounds; indeed, there is no beginning nor ending of that existence.
2.
How could there be a middle portion of that which has no "before" and "after";
It follows that "past," "future," and "simultaneous events" do not obtain.
Birth and death are not separate/different, not simultaneous/the same.
3.
If birth is regarded as the former, and growing old and dying are regarded as coming into being later,
Then birth exists without growing old and dying, and something is born without death.
4.
If birth were later, and growing old and dying were earlier,
How would there be an uncaused growing old and dying of something unborn?
5.
And a birth which is simultaneous with growing old and dying is likewise impossible;
For, that which is being born would die, and both would be without cause.
6.
Since the past, future, and simultaneous activity do not originate,
To what purpose do you explain in detail the existence of birth, growing old and dying?
7.
That which is produced and its cause, as well as the characteristic and that which is characterized,
The sensation and the one who senses, and whatever other things there are --
8.
Not only is the former limit of existence-in-flux (samsara) not to be found,
But the former limit of all those things is not to be found.
Section 12
An Analysis of Sorrow (Suffering) In 10 verses
1.
Some say:
Sorrow (dukkha) is produced by oneself (i),
or by another (ii),
or by both itself and another (iii),
or from no cause at all (iv);
But to consider that sorrow (dukkha) as what is produced is not possible.
2.
If it were produced by itself (i.e. self-causation), it would not exist dependent on something else.
Certainly those "groups of universal elements" (skandhas) exist presupposing these "groups."
3.
If these were different from those, or if those were different from these,
Sorrow (dukkha) would be produced by something other than itself (i.e. other-causation), because those would be made by these others.
4.
If sorrow (dukkha) is made through one's own personality (i) (svapudgala), then one's own personality would be without sorrow (dukkha);
Who is that "own personality" by which sorrow (dukkha) is self-produced (i)?
5.
If sorrow (dukkha) were produced by a different personality (ii) (parapudgala),
How would he, to whom is given that sorrow (dukkha) by another after he had produced it, be without sorrow (dukkha)?
6.
If sorrow (dukkha) is produced by a different personality, who is that different personality
Who, while being without sorrow (dukkha), yet makes and transmits that sorrow (dukkha) to the other?
7.
It is not established that sorrow (dukkha) is self-produced (i), but how is sorrow (dukkha) produced by another (ii)?
Certainly the sorrow (dukkha), which would be produced by another (ii), in his case would be self-produced (i’).
8.
Sorrow (dukkha) is not self-produced (i), for that which is produced is certainly not produced by that personality.
If the "other" (para) is not produced by the individual self (atma), how would sorrow (dukkha) be that produced by another?
9.
Sorrow (dukkha) could be made by both self and the "other" (iii) if it could be produced by either one.
But not produced by another, and not self-produced (iv) —how can sorrow (dukkha) exist without a caused
10.
Not only are the four causal interpretations not possible in respect to sorrow (dukkha),
but also none of the four causal interpretations is possible even in respect to external things (bhava).
Section 13 -
An Analysis of Conditioned Elements (the real) In 8 verses
1.
A thing of which the basic elements are deception is vain, as the glorious one said.
All conditioned elements (samskara) are things that have basic elements (dharma) which are deception; therefore, they are vain.
2.
"If that which has deceptive basic elements is vain, what is there which deceives?"
This was spoken by the glorious one to illuminate "emptiness."
3.
An opponent says:
There is non-self-existence of things since a thing, by observation, becomes something else. (i.e. impermanence)
A thing without self-existence does not exist—due to the emptiness of existing things.
4.
If self-existence does not exist, whose "other-existence" would there be?
Nargarjuna answers:
If self-existence does exist, whose "other-existence" would there be?
5.
Just as there is no other-existence of a thing, so also an-other-existence of something else is not possible—
Since a youth is not aging (jiryate), and since "who has already aged" is not aging (jiryate).
6.
If there would be an other-existence of a thing, milk would exist as curds.
But surely "being curds" will be something other than milk.
7.
If something would be non-empty, something would logically also be empty
But nothing is non-empty, so how will it become empty?
8.
Emptiness is proclaimed by the victorious one as the refutation of all viewpoints;
But those who hold "emptiness" as a viewpoint—the true perceivers have called those "incurable" (asadhya).
Section 14
An Analysis of Unification (Combination) In 8 verses
1.
That which is seen, sight, and the "seer": these three
Do not combine together either in pairs or altogether.
2.
Desire, the one who desires, and the object of desire have to be regarded in the same way,
As also the impurities which remain and the three kinds of "base of sense" (ayatana) which remain.
3.
Some hold: There is unification (samsarga) of one different thing with another different thing; but since the different-ness
Of what is seen, etc. does not exist, those factors do not enter into unification.
4.
Not only does the different-ness of that which is seen, etc. not exist,
Also the different-ness of something coming from another does not obtain.
5.
A thing is different insofar as it presupposes a second different thing.
One thing is not different from another thing without the other thing.
6.
If one different thing is different from a second different thing, it exists without a second different thing;
But without a second different thing, one different thing does not exist as a different thing.
7.
Different-ness does not exist in a different thing, nor in what is not different.
When different-ness does not exist, then there is neither what is different nor "this" from which something can be different.
8.
Unification is not possible by uniting one thing with that one thing, nor by uniting one thing with a different thing;
Thus, the becoming unified, the state of being united, and the one who unites are not possible.